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Participation and the poverty of electoral democracy in Madagascar1 
  
 
 
Abstract 
 
On December 16, 2001 Marc Ravalomanana, took the lead over incumbent Didier Ratsiraka in 
the first round of presidential elections in Madagascar.  The vote count brought an electoral 
crisis. The Ministry of the Interior argued that Ravalomanana won 46% of the vote, while an 
independent commission saw Ravalomanana as having won 50.5% of the vote, and thus the 
presidency, in the first round.  Hundreds of thousands of Malagasy citizens took to the streets in 
support of Ravalomanana, leading to a violent five-month conflagration.  This paper asks: If a 
challenger is faced with a highly flawed electoral process and a dearth of constitutional options 
for rectifying the outcome then is he justified in taking extra-constitutional measures?  Where 
electoral democracy focuses on process to the exclusion of more liberal democratic measures, 
that process must ultimately produce an indisputable outcome or else the democratization  
process is in jeopardy. 
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On December 16, 2001 a political newcomer, Marc Ravalomanana, outpaced the incumbent 
in the presidential election. This was a critical moment in Malagasy history because it not only 
marked the decline of President Didier Ratsiraka’s 27-year old patronage network, but the 
rise of the prodigal son of the country’s new business elite. The vote count brought an 
electoral crisis. The National Electoral Commission (CNE) and the Ministry of the Interior 
argued that Ravalomanana won 46.6% of the vote, the Consortium of Election Observers 
(consisting of international representatives and members of Malagasy civil society) saw 
Ravalomanana as having won 50.5% of the vote, and Ravalomanana himself declared that he 
                                                          
1  An earlier and shorter version of this paper appeared as “Madagascar: A New Democracy” in Current History  
Vol. 102, No. 664 (May 2003) 
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had won 52.2%.  The differences are key as, following from the French system, an absolute 
majority is necessary in order to avoid a second round of balloting.   
 The 1992 Malagasy constitution mandates that disputed electoral results are 
reviewed by the High Constitutional Court (HCC).  This Court responded with unabashedly 
partisan response in favor of the incumbent.  In its January 16, 2002 ruling, it did call for a 
recount of the vote but insisted that the quasi-governmental CNE conduct the recount without 
oversight from the Court, the independent National Consortium of Election Observers (CNOE), 
or representatives from either leading candidate.  Ravalomanana’s concern was the Court’s 
unwillingness to support a transparent vote count; he responded: "The HCC has responded to 
our demand, but it is not enough. We want it to do the comparisons itself and not to give the 
job to the CNE, which is not entitled to do it... and which is not credible." (Agence France 
Press, January 16, 2002)  The Court’s ruling, undertaken in secrecy, outside of the capital in 
the small town of Mantasoa, stood. 
 Ravalomanana’s constitutional options were exhausted.  His only legal option was to 
accept the results of the elections as proffered by a CNE led by people long entangled in the 
presidential web of patronage, upheld by a Court displaying at best a lack of judicial 
responsibility and at worst questionable independence.  His only other options were extra-
constitutional measures. Ravalomanana asked the people of Madagascar to support 
“democracy.” In an unprecedented show of support, hundreds of thousands of Malagasy 
citizens from all parts of society took to the streets of Antananarivo for weeks on end. In an 
echo of the social movement that acted as catalyst for democracy a decade ago, the 
economy came to a grinding halt. Only this time Ratsiraka did not compromise, he dug in and 
refused any evaluation of power or electoral transparency. Ravalomanana, short of fresh 
options, used his popularity to declare himself president, appoint government ministers, and 
effectively force Ratsiraka’s government into exile in the coastal city of Toamasina.  
 At the heart of the matter is the question: If a challenger is faced with a highly flawed 
electoral process and a dearth of constitutional options for rectifying the outcome then does 
that give him license to undertake extra-constitutional measures in the name of a more 
democratic end? This paper argues that as electoral democracy focuses on process to the 
exclusion of more liberal democratic measures and the reliance on a vital civil society, that 
process must ultimately produce an indisputable outcome. If it fails at this one primary task 
then even this most minimal form of democracy loses its meaning and jeopardizes the 
democratization process. In this case the process failed to offer the vote as a primary 
expression of popular will. This is not merely a Rousseauian treatise on the virtues of a social 
contract acting as guarantor that the will of the people will be heard.  People in Madagascar 
fundamentally desire the same outcomes from their democracy – freedom, voice in 
government, security – as people in Western countries do. (Marcus et. al 2001; CNOE 2000; 
Roubaud 2000)  Since democracy in Madagascar is not deep enough to allow for other forms 
of participation (contestation by civil society, political party pressure, media scrutiny, etc.) to 
under-gird government legitimacy, civic action was not only an acceptable option but the only 
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option for saving the country from a significant backslide towards an opaque political system 
led by a self-serving autocrat. A social movement that ultimately brought over half of the 
population of the capital into the streets may have been a sign of muted revolutionary 
tendency and political instability, but it also served as an important participation mechanism 
protecting basic liberties from a predatory state.  Where there is such an immediate threat to 
the meaning of democracy such action form a Madisonian institutional argument that liberty 
must be protected at all costs because it is essential to political life. (Federalist 10 in 
Hamilton et. al. 2001) The conclusion drawn from Madagascar’s recent experience is that the 
institutions of electoral democracy are easily subverted and offer few protections for a 
citizenry anxious to express its will. The broadening and deepening of liberal democracy is 
thus not a luxury of rich countries seeking the expansion of personal freedoms, but rather an 
important part of ensuring the success of the democratization process and, ultimately, 
political stability. 
 
 
 
Madagascar’s institutional environment: a background 
 
Electoral cycles are commonly counted by ballots cast for the highest leadership.  By this 
measure Madagascar’s founding elections were held in November1992, with a second round 
in February 1993.  At this pivotal moment in Malagasy history the failed regime of Didier 
Ratsiraka, in place from 1975, was replaced by the voice of the “new democrat,” Albert Zafy . 
Albert Zafy was a highly charismatic leader. He formed a vibrant opposition coalition, the Hery 
Velona (Living Forces) and was in large part responsible for the civil servants strike and 
subsequent social movement that forced Ratsiraka to agree to a transitional government in 
October 1991.  Unfortunately, he was a terrible president.  He used his time in office to 
centralize power under his office.  He won a landmark constitutional referendum in September 
1995 effectively shifting the country from a parliamentary system back to a presidential 
system, beginning a series of constitutional shifts that undermine the value of the document, 
and he tightened the purse strings of the decentralized regional authorities.  Self-seeking 
behavior and poor governance are not sufficient grounds for removal from office, but 
corruption is.  Ultimately, the High Court found President Zafy to have acted fraudulently and 
upheld the National Assembly’s decision to impeach him in September 1996.  This was 
certainly a positive sign for institutional strength.  The President of the High Court, Norbert 
Ratsirahonana,, became interim President of the Republic until elections could be held in 
December 1996. 
 The second elections of Madagascar’s new democracy offered the Malagasy citizenry 
three viable options.  They could choose the impeached and discredited Albert Zafy, the 
uncharismatic technocrat of the High Court, Norbert Ratsirahonana, or the former dictator 
Didier Ratsiraka.  They chose the latter.  Despite charges of electoral malfeasance from the 
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opposition, the 51 percent victory was upheld by the High Constitutional Court and led to the 
rapid swearing in of President Ratsiraka.  The elections of 1996 showed three important 
emerging patterns.  First, they showed a high polarization of candidate popularity by region.  
Second, they marked an alarmingly high degree of abstentionism, itself marked by 
polarization by region.  Whereas abstentions were only 25.6% for the first round and 31.6% 
for the second round in 1992/3, in 1996/7 abstentionism was 41.6% and 50.3% (Roubaud 
2000). Clearly the energy of the 1991 movement and the excitement of new democracy had 
begun to be replaced with the realities of a political sphere reticent to change in the eyes of 
the populace.  The CNOE has gone so far as to call this a “crisis of citizenship.” (CNOE 2000)  
Third, it showed how politicians, and in particular Didier Ratsiraka, learned to manipulate the 
electorate.  Madagascar has a free press as evidenced in particular by the Midi 
Madagasikara.  However, with this leading daily having a circulation of only 50,000, and 
televisions few and far between, radio is the primary conduit of information.  Absent sufficient 
channels of information, Ratsiraka successfully used his control of the radio to “condition” 
the voting populace. (Roubaud 2001). 
 If second elections showed that Ratsiraka learned to manipulate the electorate, third 
elections showed he learned to legally manipulate political institutions. Madagascar’s third 
elections did not begin with the presidential balloting of December 16, 2001.  The cycle really 
began with the constitutional referendum of March 15, 1998.  At this critical juncture 
President Ratsiraka campaigned to devolve the political system to resemble the spirit, if not 
the flavor, of the Second Republic (1975-1992).  It was a clever proposition in that it 
mimicked cries for decentralization by international donors and thus won the support of 
international actors and the domestic intelligencia.  Yet at root it was really an attempt to 
remove power from the capital, notably the National Assembly, (Roubaud 2001) and place it 
in the provinces where the president has greater support.  Under this measure the provinces 
would have great fiscal responsibility for spending funds distributed directly from the 
ministries.  While the provinces had increased fiscal responsibilities they didn’t receive all of 
the money entitled to them to carry out their new tasks.  The broader Malagasy population 
likely didn’t even realize that the amendment was about fiscal divestiture or the creation of 
autonomous provinces at all.  Ratsiraka campaigned that it was a development measure and 
the voting populace saw it as a referendum on the president.  It passed 51 percent to 49 
percent.  The subsequent election for the National Assembly on May 17, 1998 led to the 
president’s AREMA party winning 63 of the chamber’s 150 seats.  With the close Leader 
Fanilo party winning 16 seats and mostly pro-Ratsiraka independents winning 32 seats, the 
president could count on absolute support. 
 In December 2000 Madagascar held its first local elections for provincial councils 
under the 1998 constitutional revision.  In a sign of a continued crisis of abstentionism and 
lack of public knowledge of the process, only an estimated 10 percent of voters turned out at 
the polls. Those that did vote did so at the behest of the president.  Ratsiraka’s AREMA party 
won approximately 95 percent of the vote.  
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 Following the constitutional change, a senate, mandated in 1992, was finally formed. 
Elections were held in March 2001. As the provincial councils chose the senators in indirect 
elections, AREMA won 49 of the 60 contested seats; under Article 77.1 of the Malagasy 
Constitution the president appoints the remaining 30 senators.  Ratsiraka thus controlled  79 
seats in the senate.  This was critical as not only did it become the higher chamber, but the 
president of the senate became the first in presidential succession. 
 Constitutional Law 98-001 implementing the constitutional changes of 1998 states 
that governors are chosen by the provincial councils in indirect elections.  Not surprisingly in 
the June 2001 balloting, AREMA governors, and in fact notable colleagues of the president, 
were elected in 5 of the 6 provinces.    That Ratsiraka did not win Anatananarivo province 
would end up proving important in the aftermath of the 2001 elections.  
 On November 22, 2001 President Ratsiraka approved Decree N° 2001-1081.  This 
law ratified the High Constitutional Court’s appointment of Georges T Indrianjafy as President 
of the High Constitutional Court as per its right granted by Article 107 of the constitution.  
This should be seen as an indication of the leanings of the Court as Indrianjafy had held close 
relations to Ratsiraka since he became Justice Minister in 1976.  He was a member of 
Ratsiraka’s Conseil Suprê me de la Ré volution and was appointed to the High Constitutional 
Court by Ratsiraka.  At the same time Ratsiraka appointed another close associate, Benjamin 
Rakotomandimby, to the court.   At the time, Indian Ocean Newsletter went so far as to 
comment that “Intervening as it does right before the campaign for the presidential election 
of December 16 begins, the nomination of a former Ratsiraka minister to the head of the HCC 
illustrates the incumbent's determination to keep a sharp eye on the institution that will be in 
charge of validating the electoral results and of verifying cases of electoral fraud, should any 
arise.” (Indian Ocean Newsletter, December 1, 2001)  In short, the High Constitutional Court 
was well stacked. 
 Heading into the December 2001 elections there clearly was no balance of power.  
Indeed, with the president nominally controlling both houses of the legislature, the judiciary, 
the provincial councils, and the governorships, there was little room for challenges to his 
authority.  What is notable here is that legally Didier Ratsiraka does not appear to have done 
anything wrong.  He came back into office via a popular vote, he won a constitutional change 
by popular referendum, and he solidified his power base in the other instruments of 
governance through decidedly constitutional processes.  The problem is that the constitution, 
never a stellar document, has been so manipulated over the past decade that it no longer 
acts as a guarantor of institutional independence.  Indirectly or directly, the powers of the 
state ultimately reside in the hands of the executive who can act legally virtually without 
impunity. 
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Beyond the institutions: the look and feel of personal rule 
 
Ratsiraka used his second political life, and AREMA’s omnipresence, as an opportunity to 
retrench his neopatrimonial network. During this period there were a litany of AREMA 
benefactors that considered themselves friends of Didier Ratsiraka.  Family members in the 
private sector have benefited perhaps even more greatly: Elyse Ratsiraka became a board 
member of Galana in Toamasina, the country’s largest refinery. (This relationship proved 
important following the December 2001 elections as President Ratsiraka strangled 
distribution of petroleum to the capital.)  Ratsiraka’s daughter, Annick Ratsiraka, was charged 
with organizing the Francophonie in Antananarivo in 1997, and was named to the 
administration council of Air Madagascar presided over by Ratisraka’s close counselor Nirina 
Andriamanerasoa.  His daughter Sophie, whose husband Mamy Ranaivo became Director 
General of the Society of Exploitation of Minerals, KRAOMA, became a powerful advocate for 
her father, sitting on the board of the Banque de Solidarité  Malgache (BSM), Global 
Madagascar (telecommunications), and the like, receiving significant funding for the creation 
of non-profit organizations in the name of AREMA. His son Xavier, a pilot, became Director 
General of the Society of Malagasy Air Navigation (Sonavam) at the age of 23. Roland 
Ratsiraka, his nephew, became Mayor of Toamasina (the president’s native city). Daniele 
Ratsiraka, his niece, was appointed to the Malagasy embassy in Paris in 1999.  The list goes 
on.   
 Even more critical to Ratsiraka’s successes during his Third Republic reign was his 
political patrimony via AREMA.  For instance, Samuel Lahady was President of the Executive 
Committee of Toamasina when Ratsiraka took power in 1975.  A close colleague of the 
president, he held a series of important posts.  He was ousted by Albert Zafy in 1991 just to 
return as a senator appointed by Ratsiraka in 2001 and Governor of Toamasina shortly 
thereafter.  Other governors, including Governor Emilson of Fianarantsoa,  Governor Jean-
Robert Gara of Antsiranana, and Governor Jean de Dieu Benjamin Maharante of Toliara, had 
longstanding political and economic relationships with the president and his family members.  
 It should therefore be of no surprise that in February 2002 when the country began 
to bifurcate between Ratsiraka and Ravalomanana supporters the administrations of five of 
the “independent” provinces sided with Ratsiraka despite, in all but Toamasina, strong 
support for Ravalomanana by their constituents.  Thus while legally-bound institutional 
control concentrated in the hands of Ratsiraka was vital to his authority and the viability of his 
candidacy for reelection, his reconstituted neopatrimonial network was his last and only hope 
for maintaining power in a post-election environment bent on steering him from office.    
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The rise of Marc Ravalomanana 
 
When Ratsiraka’s hold on the diverse instruments of power was complete in June 2001 it 
appeared as if there was no contender that could stand to challenge his leadership let alone 
take on his dominance over the diverse institutional political power or his neopatrimonial 
network.  Malagasy news analysis appeared more concerned with the health of the president 
and whether he would try to postpone elections in order to groom a successor rather than 
serve a full five years.  At his disposal was a (98-001 enacted) constitutional mechanism 
(Articles 139-140) that affords the president the right to initiate a constitutional change and 
the National Assembly and Senate to pass the change by two-thirds majority in lieu of a 
popular referendum.  His sway over the legislature made this a real possibility.   
 Then came Marc Ravalomanana.  The sum of Ravalomanana’s political experience 
was that he was mayor of Antananarivo from 1999 to 2001.  The running joke is that 
Ravalomana decided to enter politics in 1999 by running for mayor of Antananarivo because 
there was too much red tape for him to conduct his business unfettered.  His stated reason 
was that “people are ready for big change.  But the barrier is the old system, the old 
politics.”  The change he referred to was corruption, mismanagement, unmotivated and 
underpaid municipal employees, crime, and pollution in Antananarivo.  His success in 
Antananarivo led to his decision to run for president.  In his own view, (Tiako-i-Madagasikara 
web site) “over the past two years, his result-oriented style of governance has given 
Antananarivo a dramatically needed face lifting. One prowess to be credited to the new 
mayor’s team in their ongoing efforts to clean the capital off its garbage-strewn streets and 
implementation of an efficient system to collect the city most unsightly, disease-prone 
refuse.”  Much of the city’s population seemed to agree with him.  As one man in 
Antananarivo put it (September 2001): “ I will vote for Marc Ravalomanana.  I see that he 
has been a very competent person as mayor of Tana… He has done a good job with Tana 
and he is  a good politician too”.2Before holding political office Ravalomanana was the 
founder and CEO of Tiko, SA, Madagascar’s leading dairy products company.  When 
Ravalomanana founded Tiko he made and delivered yogurt himself in his home town of 
Imerinikasina.  When the Bretton Woods institutions came to Madagascar in the early 1980s 
he was clever enough to win a small business development grant and it was from there that 
the company went national.  That he is a self-made millionaire is certainly of allure in a county 
of people who dream of economic change. 
 Ravalomanana brought to his candidacy a number of other important attributes that 
made him different from other politicians.  He is a practicing Christian, and his spiritual life 
has had a strong interplay with both his private and public sector success.  All Tiko 
employees are required to go to church, though not necessarily a Protestant church per his 
own faith.  As he was Vice President of Madagascar’s most important religious association, 
                                                          
2   This response was from a respondent in Antananarivo September 22, 2001.  The survey was designed and 
conducted by the authors. 
 
Richard R. Marcus / Paul Razafindrakoto 
 
 
 
  
 34 
the Church of Jesus Christ in Madagascar (FJKM), he won support for his candidacy for both 
Mayor of Antananarivo and President of Madagascar from the important church sector of 
Malagasy civil society.   He is unabashedly Anglophone, drawing a strong distinction from the 
Francophone Ratsiraka.  He is also Merina.  The Merina (ethnic group) came to dominate the 
island in the late 18th and 19th century.  Under a politique des races, the French showed 
preference for Merina who held a position of privilege in the colonial administration.  As a 
result, historically the strongest political divide in Madagascar has been between the Merina 
and the seventeen other ethnic groups.  No Merina had ever been able to overcome the 
animosity held toward the Merina to become president.  Finally, and most importantly, when 
he announced his candidacy from his home town on August 3, 2001 most of the country 
outside of the capital had no idea who he was.  This actually proved a benefit in a country 
yearning for a political outsider. 
 Ravalomanana speaks Malagasy with a decidedly provincial flavor.  In contrast to the 
linguistically refined Ratsiraka, he is not confident enough in either his French or his English 
language skills to give interviews to the international press without an interpreter. He is not a 
brilliant orator, but he is charismatic and markedly good-looking.  He has successfully used 
that winning combination to become a brilliant networker, and enviable personality.  So much 
so that the people of Madagascar rapidly came to feel that he was one of “them” despite his 
ethnicity and personal wealth. 
 
 
 
The eve of the 2001 Elections 
 
Marc Ravalomanana sy ny vahoaka be  (Marc Ravalomanana and the many citizens) 
Firaisam-pirenena (For national unity) 
Ho an'ny Fiovana! (For Change!) 
Ho Filoha! (For President!)    
   Campaign Slogan for Marc Ravalomanana 
  
 
In interviews conducted in the capital in August 2001, Ravalomanana’s name hardly ever 
came up.  The political landscape continued to appear opaque and fragmented.  By 
September, the common view in the capital could be summed up by the following statement: 
 
“Our life is now just guided by one person; that means only AREMA with its friends lead the power 
of the country. Those who have their houses demolished, have no any roof to cover them, those 
who have nothing to eat remaining, those who are punished, remain punished.  The leaders 
become more and more rich -- that is one of many reasons we complained about our country.  
Democracy is just written on paper but not followed by any in our country. I think that is time to 
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change.  I like Marc Ravalomanana so much.  He needs to replace Ratsiraka as it is time for his 
dismissal.”3  
  
Marc Ravalomanana was seen as young, successful at the helm of Tiko and at the helm of 
Antananarivo.  He squared off against weak city institutions and attempted to seek a better 
application of the governance process.  Most of the country was yearning for this sort of 
political change (CNOE 2000) and Ravalomanana had it to offer.  His victory in the capital 
was assured from the outset, so his focus was immediately on the provinces.  The difficulties 
he faced were three-fold.  First, people in the countryside did not know who he is.  Second, 
he had to overcome the immense institutional challenges posed by Ratsiraka. Third, he would 
have to overcome Ratsiraka’s neopatrimonial network to ensure that the mechanisms of 
popular voice would not be overshadowed by entrenched provincial elites. 
 To overcome the first challenge Ravalomanana began an intensive campaign, 
circulating not only to provincial capitals, but to rural areas.  For the first time in Malagasy 
history a candidate was in a position to use his own financial resources to travel by 
helicopter.  Ravalomanana hired eight South African helicopters to ferry him and his 
colleagues from village to village spreading the message that he can develop Madagascar 
just as he developed Tiko.   
 Ravalomanana has used Tiko distribution channels to enhance his political presence 
in the countryside and he has used the network of Tiko employees to help run his campaign.  
Tiko has 14 stores in the country.  There is a large distribution center in the Antananairvo 
quarter of Akorondrano, strategically opened next to the original location of Madagascar’s 
premier supermarket, Gé ant Score.  Yet, while Gé ant Score is owned by a Ré unnionnais 
concern (Sucreries de Bourbon), Tiko is decidedly Malagasy.  Management is Malagasy and 
product inputs are Malagasy.  As the distribution has increased throughout the island, so 
inputs have come from diverse parts of the island.  This has allowed Ravalomanana the 
opportunity to demonstrate his nationalist tendencies. 
 The expansion of Tiko’s interests across the island, and use of goods from across the 
island, is consistent with Ravalomanana’s own brand of nationalism.  Many Tiko products are 
inscribed with “Vita Malagasy” (Made in Madagascar).  He himself has said that this is to 
“counterbalance the undesirable influences brought by foreigners.” (Africa Intelligence, 
2002)  This nationalistic sentiment manifested itself in his campaign slogan for mayor of 
Antananarivo: “Tiako Iarivo” (I love Antananarivo), and his campaign for the presidency, 
“Tiako-i-Madagasikara” (I love Madagascar).  Further, he cleverly evaded the electoral code 
ban (put in place by Ratsiraka) on using consumer goods for campaigning through the use of 
parallel distribution channels (eg. passing out shirts for Ravalomanana TIM and hats with the 
                                                          
3  This response was from a respondent in Antananarivo September 22, 2001.  The  survey  was  designed and 
undertaken by the authors. This seeking someone “new” dates back to the 1996 elections. There is evidence 
gathered by the author in 1997-98 (Marcus 2000)  and by the  CNOE in 2000 that a majority of respondents 
use “a new person” as a criteria for selecting a candidate.   
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Tiko logo together), and through word play (workers wearing Tiako i Madagasikara T-shirts 
selling yogurt with the new slogan Tia Tiko [Love Tiko]).  
 The second problem Ravalomanana had to overcome were the institutional 
challenges posed by the dominance of Ratsiraka.  The challenges were sizeable given the 
influence of the diverse political body, but made significantly greater by electoral rules 
pronounced by presidential decree late in the electoral season: First, candidates had to fix 
their candidature by October 27.  While sensible in light of the limited time before the 
electoral contest, this was met by a significant, and unexpected, rise in the candidate 
registration fee. Many independents and candidates of smaller parties were not able to raise 
the money that rapidly.  Second, and more critical for Ravalomanana, candidates were only 
allowed to campaign between November 25th and December 15th, thereby significantly 
limiting the exposure of lesser known rivals outside the capital.  Third, the only news allowed 
to directly cover the electoral process was comprised of journalists chosen by the president.  
And, fourth, no posters were allowed to be affixed to public buildings or structures and no 
political advertisements could be associated with purchasable goods.  This last edict was 
directly aimed at the candidacy of Marc Ravalomanana.   
 The resolve Ravalomanana came up with for the last edict is described in the Tiko 
distribution channels above and he confronted the time factor, as mentioned, by employing 
helicopters.  But in order to succeed in overcoming institutional inertia, and separate himself 
from the pack of unviable challengers to the throne, he needed to campaign as a populist.  
There was reason to believe this would work.  Most people in Madagascar vote on a 
candidate’s personality as opposed to their principles, programs, or party. (CNOE 2000) 
Moreover, people are wholly dissatisfied with their political system, believing that politicians 
are out to fill their pockets not act for the betterment of the people. (CNOE 2000) 
 The other common institutional factor that challengers generally face is political party 
identification.  With AREMA so dominant and Ravalomanana running without a political party 
this would seem almost insurmountable.  However, in Madagascar party identification is weak. 
While AREMA is well known it is thought of – not incorrectly – as a vehicle for Ratsiraka not 
an independent institution. (Marcus and Ratsimbaharison, Forthcoming)   As such, where 
people were more likely to consider political party they were likely to vote against AREMA 
than for it.  The established opposition parties were relatively quick to realize that there was 
finally a viable challenger to Ratsiraka and threw their support behind Ravalomanana. 
 The single most important relationship Ravalomanana had to establish to unify the 
opposition behind him was Norbert Ratsirahonana and his party, AVI.  As of August 2001 
Ratsirahonana was running for the presidency once again.  Before Ravalomanana, he was the 
likely distant second candidate behind Ratsiraka.  His candidacy was fundamentally flawed by 
his technocratic image, his role in the Zafy impeachment, and his uncharismatic 
speechmaking.  The early relationship between Ratsirahonana and Ravalomanana is murky.  
However, Ratsirahonana did ultimately pull out of the race and publicly support 
Ravalomanana at the end of October 2001 and become a close associate one the new 
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administration was formed. 
 The third obstacle Ravalomanana had to overcome was the dominant neopatrimonial 
system of Ratsiraka.  He fairly successfully answered this call by using his Tiko network as a 
neopatrimonial system of his own.  He also used Madagascar’s relatively free press 
effectively.  Midi Madagasikara, the country’s leading newspaper, was behind him.  
Ravalomanana himself owns Radio MBS (Malagasy Broadcasting System).  He successfully 
made rebroadcast deals with local stations around the country to ensure his message would 
get out despite efforts at the provincial level to limit airtime.  With few campaign finance laws 
in place, there was little the provincial governors could do to limit the promulgation of his 
name.  He was free to fixate on associating his (unknown) name with the (well known) name 
of the Tiko product. 
 By the eve of the elections it was clear that short of electoral malfeasance all the 
institutional bending, electoral code revising, and regional payoffs would not secure a victory 
for Ratsiraka.  Ravalomanana would see votes siphoned off by the three remaining opposition 
candidates, but win a plurality of votes bringing about a second round of elections or perhaps 
even an absolute majority avoiding it. 
 
 
The Aftermath January – May 2002 
 
There were challenges leading up to the election that the Ratsiraka camp intentionally 
created electoral card problems, ensuring that many people in pro-Ravalomanana-areas 
would receive a card with the wrong name on it, wrong birth date or the like.  Such problems 
abound in Madagascar’s recent electoral history and generally have been largely to 
Ratsiraka’s benefit. (Marcus, Forthcoming) The most noticeable electoral violation was that 
Ratsiraka gave a speech on election day indicating that if he wasn’t re-elected there would 
upheaval. This violated his own rule that all candidate remarks must end the day before the 
election.  Yet, relative to the circumstances the balloting went well.  There were minor 
infractions reported by the CNOE, but no major irregularities.  Ballot boxes were turned in 
and ballot papers did not wash up down river.  According to the CNOE, 67 percent of 
registered voters turned out at the polls, belying the abstentionist trend and demonstrating 
the renewed vigor Ravalomanana added to Malagasy politics. 
 The real problem was not so much the voting process as the vote counting process.  
It is the CNE’s results that are official.  However, the CNOE announced before the elections 
that it would be counting as well in order to ensure that there were not irregularities.  Marc 
Ravalomanana’s own Committee (KMMR) also announced that it would count the votes.  Not 
surprisingly, they did not come to the same conclusion.   
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Table 1: Percentage of Vote Total Compared: CNE, CNOE, and KMMR 
 
 CNE CNOE KMMR 
Didier Ratsiraka 40.4 37.7 35.7 
Marc Ravalomanana 46.6 50.5 52.2 
Source: Committee to Elect Marc Ravalomanana (KMMR; http://www.tiako-i-madagasikara.org/Resultats.htm), 
Consortium of National Elections Observers (CNOE; http://www.geocities.com/consortiumobservateurs/), and 
the Malagasy National Electoral Commission (CNE)/Ministry of the Interior, Madagascar 
(http://www.dts.mg.presidentielles) 
 
 
By any count, Ravalomanana won. But while the difference between the CNOE and the 
Ravalomanana count holds little consequence, the difference from the official CNE count is 
critical as it would indicate, following Article 47 of the Malagasy constitution, that an absolute 
majority was not achieved and a second round was necessary.   
 As discussed, the initial ruling of the court – that a recount was to take place but 
solely under the auspices of the CNE – appeared strongly biased towards Ratsiraka.  Few 
institutions would overturn their own count and even fewer would do so while operating under 
an executive that dominates the political sphere.  The High Constitutional Court decided in 
January that the CNE count stood and there would be a second round of elections.   
 Ravalomanana wanted no part of it.  He argued that without a transparent process in 
the first round, how can a satisfactory result be guaranteed in a second round.  Only if the 
votes were counted by the High Court with all interested parties from the candidates and the 
international community looking on would he accept the result of the vote count.  With this 
ruled out, Ravalomanana called for a general strike on January 26, 2002.   
 Throughout January the "Place de 13 mai" in Antananarivo, an historic flashpoint for 
political activism, was filled with greater than 100,000 people filling the Analakely district.  
Ravalomanana would make a speech to the crowd every day at noon and then tell them to go 
back to work.  But with the strike declared, estimates ranging from 500,000 to one million 
people swelled the streets protesting the vote count.  Notably, the protestors represented a 
cross-section of urban Madagascar in social, class, and caste.  Even the Merina-cô tier divide 
that for the first time in independent Malagasy history appeared irrelevant to the election, 
managed to remain an unimportant issue. (Marcus and Ratsimbaharison, Forthcoming)  
Ravalomanana championed the people repeating: “You have rights, don't let yourselves be 
intimidated, don't let yourselves be bought, trust in God.”  Demonstration, he argued, is the 
right of the people under democracy so people should choose democracy over the 
oppression of Ratsiraka’s manipulations.   
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At first the demonstrations remained non-violent.  Even once violence began to step up, it 
remained fairly isolated.  There was no police presence in the streets, no military presence.  
Just that many people could gather to protest with only minor skirmishes was in itself an early 
victory.  Indeed, well into February the ambiance in Place 13 mai was one of dancing, and 
singing – a folksy happening of peaceful protest, a carnival atmosphere.  People sold 
balloons and food while Tiko products were distributed for free or subsidized prices.   
 In February Ravalomanana took one last approach announcing that he would accept 
a second round of elections under four conditions: 1) there are international observers 
(barred by Ratsiraka in the first round) 2) the CNE would be rearranged with representation 
from other groups 3) assurance that sanctions would be levied against the demonstrators 
and 4) a change in the process of scrutinizing the ballots (effectively marginalizing the High 
Constitutional Court).  His request was more ignored than rejected by the prime minister’s 
office and the Ratsiraka administration.  On February 22, 2002 Marc Ravalomanana declared 
himself president.  This created a significant disjuncture with the international community and 
significantly escalated the crisis.  The Secretary General of the Organization of African Unity 
(OAU), Amara Essy,  took perhaps the strongest stance after which he stated “I made it clear 
to Ravalomanana’s supporters that if their candidate was inaugurated contrary to con-
stitutional provisions, the OAU would neither tolerate nor accept that unconstitutional change 
of Government, by virtue of the Algiers Decision of July 1999 and the Lomé  Declaration of July 
2000.  I therefore encouraged him to accept the second round to confirm the choice of 
voters.”  Ravalomanana countered that Ratsiraka was merely using the time to mobilize his 
cronies to ensure a proper second round could not be successful.  Further OAU efforts 
proved futile. 
 Constitutionally Ratsiraka was in the right. He used this opportunity to try to 
centralize his power.  Article 59 of the Malagasy constitution states that the President may 
declare Martial Law, effectively wresting power from both the provinces and the other 
branches of government if “agreement of the Presidents of the National Assembly, the 
Senate, and the Constitutional Court.”  Since he successfully manipulated the system in order 
to control the National Assembly, the Senate, and, to some degree, the High Constitutional 
Court, he was able to legally implement Martial Law on March 1, 2002. Thus the suspension 
of the right to protest, the strong armed tactics of the military, and the attempts to control 
the press that followed were all within Ratsiraka’s constitutional rights.  This holds even 
though he used these rights to further his political claim and avoid a transparent counting of 
the votes.  In this case the subversion of the intent of constitutional order had more grievous 
consequences on the outcomes of the electoral process than the overtly extra-constitutional 
measures of Marc Ravalomanana.      
 The situation escalated dramatically. The carnival atmosphere in "Place 13 Mai" was 
gone and in its place was a smaller, more vitriolic crowd.  Youth groups of both candidates 
fought in the streets of Antananarivo.  Ratsiraka was forced to flea the capital for his home 
town, Toamisina, where he tried to set up a rival capital.  Both sides marshaled military 
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forces.  Ratsiraka’s forces began attempting to cut off the capital through the use of road 
blocks, blowing up bridges, and threatening transporters not to operate. Further he began a 
campaign of violence in which his supporters would both threaten, and in some cases kill, 
Merina merchants on the coast.  In a sign that ethnicity is at the mercy of political 
entrepreneurs,4 he rallied his supporters to pretend they were Merina and threaten cô tier 
groups in the hopes of raising the specter of ethnopolitics against Ravalomanana.   
Ravalomanana’s acting “Prime Minister,” Jacques Sylla, reacted saying “We do not accept any 
terrorist act committed in our territory.”  So began the reclassification of Ratsiraka’s support 
movement. 
 Discussions began regarding a possible “third voice.”  Everyone agreed that neither 
Ratsiraka nor Ravalomanana were working with administrative efficiency for the betterment of 
the state.  The crisis of legitimacy could jeopardize not just political order but the state itself.  
Unlikely bedfellows of functionaries and old guard military leaders began discussing whether 
it was necessary to abrogate the constitution and install a military government to bring about 
stability (on the presumption that it would hold new civilian elections shortly thereafter).  At 
root was the concern that Ratsiraka was well beyond overturning his blockades and 
Ravalomanana was well beyond calling people off the streets – perhaps neither man could 
ultimately gain back the functioning of the country. 
 The active military appeared to shy away from this option.  Most tried to stay out of 
the conflict without adding significantly to the troops of each of the two “presidents.”   The 
moment of truth for the military came in the first week of March as Ravalomanana’s “Prime 
Minister,” Jacques Sylla and his ministers, backed by tens of thousands of unarmed 
supporters, drove Ratsiraka’s minister’s out of their offices and took over.  Security forces 
refused commands to hold the ministries at any cost (that is, fire on the crowd) and instead 
stood down. By mid-March it appeared as if the country was balkanizing and fears of civil war 
began to grow.   If the military had split rather than remained mostly on the sidelines then 
this could have been a possibility. 
 In a first real attempt to resolve the crisis President Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal 
invited the two sides to Dakar for a Summit.  Ratsiraka and Ravalomanana debated the issues 
with the guidance of President Mathieu Ké ré kou of Benin, President Joaquim Chissano of 
Mozambique and President Laurent Gbagbo of Cô te d’Ivoire. The result was the Dakar 
Agreement of April 18, 2002.  The five article Agreement was in sum a compromise in which 
both sides agreed to a popular referendum if there was no clear victor from the first round of 
elections.  In this event, a transitional government would be established and an Independent 
Electoral Commission would replace the National Electoral Commission. Unfortunately the 
timing of the Agreement was unpropitious as on April 16, 2002 the Administrative Chamber 
of the Supreme Court overturned the January 25, 2002 ruling of the High Constitutional Court 
                                                          
4  For a discussion of ethnicity at the mercy of political entrepreneurs in Madagasar see: Roubaud, Francois  
(2001)   
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mandating a second round of elections.  The same Chamber also annulled decree No.2001-
1080 of November 22, 2001 which stacked the High Constitutional Court in Ratsiraka’s favor.   
 As a result of the Chamber’s action, Ratsiraka distanced himself from the Dakar 
Agreement.  On April 29, 2002 the newly constituted High Constitutional Court announced the 
results of its recount: Ravalomanana 51.46 percent, Ratsiraka: 35.90 percent.  Ratsiraka 
reacted: "three of its nine members, including the president, did not sit in the deliberations 
and four of the six others who effectively participated in what is referred to as a vote-counting 
exercise, are in fact close to the Marc Ravalomanana camp.”  He did not accept the results 
and the violence escalated further while Ravalomanana was re-inaugurated president, this 
time in front of the Court and the International Community, on May 6, 2002. 
 The OAU attempts at shuttle diplomacy throughout May failed.  A second Dakar 
meeting was held June 8-9, 2002.  This time Ravalomanana was in a much more favorable 
position and made sure all in attendance knew it.  The unusual agreement that resulted 
(Dakar II) stated that both sides agreed to early legislative elections.  If Ravalomanana’s 
supporters were to win a majority then Ratsiraka would recognize the presidency of 
Ravalomanana; if Ratsiraka’s supporters were to win the legislative majority then 
Ravalomanana would agree to a presidential referendum.  In contrast to Dakar I, this was a 
poor agreement that not only undermined the Malagasy constitution, but belittled the 
importance of the separation of powers.  Its success would be predicated on the population 
voting in the same pattern for a legislator as for the president, a significant process violation 
that made mockery of the importance of popular participation. 
 The Dakar II Agreement proved no more resilient than the Dakar I Agreement.  It did 
not even bring about a lull in the conflict.  At this point, Ratsiraka was in trouble.  He had the 
support of all the governors but that of Antananarivo, but popular protests in favor of 
Ravalomanana were taking their toll in Fianarantsoa, Mahajanga, and Antsiranana as it did in 
Antananarivo.   
 By mid-June Ravalomanana’s security forces took control of all key port towns 
including Toamasina.  Ratsiraka fled for France on June 15, 2002.  Ravalomanana was 
president of Madagascar to all major foreign powers save the African Union.   Most 
importantly, he was then the undisputed president of the country. 
 
 
  
When is a social movement not a social movement but rather a democratic 
action? 
 
“No one can govern in a vacuum.  The exercise of power is determined by thousands of interactions 
between the world of the powerful and that of the powerless, all the more so because these worlds are 
never divided by a sharp line: everyone has a small part of himself in both.” 
 Vaclav Havel (1990: 182) 
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Vaclav Havel wrote this statement in the context of a nascent Czech transition from 
authoritarian rule.  He says that “[s]omething is happening in the social awareness, though it 
is still an undercurrent as yet, rather than something visible.  And all this brings subtle 
pressure to bear on the powers that govern society.”  The world knows that in the years that 
followed this 1986 statement Havel became a cardinal element in bringing about a more 
visible social movement and placing pressure on the powers that govern society. 
The question for those of us trying to decide if what happened in Madagascar’s post-election 
period was positive is: Was the social movement a dangerous insurgency or was it a legitimate 
form of democratic participation in the absence of a viable electoral mechanism and a strong civil 
society? These two issues are closely wrapped up in one another.  The answers too are wrapped 
up in one another.  It is a legitimate form of participation that is rooted in frustration. The popular 
movement is in fact a legitimate form of democratic participation in this instance because the 
elections did not provide a valid result.  Ravalomanana could not have brought more than half the 
population of the capital to the streets if people were not frustrated with a patently poor electoral 
exercise governed by constitutional but wholly unrepresentative institutional leaders.  An 
undercurrent rapidly became an overt pressure on the incumbent regime. 
The institutional manipulation described above should make it clear that Madagascar’s 
democracy has not been one ripe with opportunities for the citizenry.  It has suffered from what 
Joshua Forrest (Forthcoming) calls hybridity – elements of democracy and liberal politics operate 
in contexts where neopatrimonial and authoritarian tendencies remain.  In effect, the people of 
Antananarivo (then Fianarantsoa, Mahajanga, and Antsiranana) used the freedoms granted by 
democracy to protest against institutions atrophying under neopatrimonial rule.   
 This phenomenon is neither original nor new.  Democracy came into its own in 
Europe and the U.S. in the 1830s and 1840s when modern social movements – from labor 
movements to nationalist movements – gave rise to what became the great ideological 
debate between communism and liberal democracy. 
 
“In England, it is in these years that the Chartists, the first mass working-class movement in the 
world, and perhaps the largest mass political activity in any European country during the nineteenth 
century, came to speak of the Democracy as the movement of the people.”  
(Denning 2001) 
  
New social movements in Latin America, have been well broadly discussed and their relevancy 
to modern democratization significantly probed.   A common conclusion, as argued by Arturo 
Escobar (2001: 322), is that social movements that achieve political goals in fact help 
undermine clientalism. It gives participants in the movement a sense of efficacy. 
 In short, if political mobilization is “the process by which a group goes from being a 
passive collection of individuals to an active participant in public life” (Tilly 1978: 69) then six 
to eight percent of Malagasy society became active political participants in a truly overt 
fashion.  Considering the level of commitment and sacrifice it demands to take to the streets, 
this is a remarkable popular expression. 
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 Most importantly, the population of Madagascar wanted Marc Ravalomanana to be its 
president.  As the distribution of votes demonstrates, this holds not just in the capital, but 
throughout most of the country. 
 
 
  Table 2: Results of the 2001 presidential elections (after recount) 
 
 
Province 
 
 
Marc Ravalomanana 
 
Didier Ratsiraka 
Antananarivo 1 027 535 63.88% 481 398 29.93% 
Antsirananana 129 489 38.23% 102 668 30.31% 
Fianarantsoa 402 393 51.75% 252 506 32.47% 
Mahajanga 256 561 53.58% 158 341 33.07% 
Toamasina 253 936 34.56% 415 836 56.59% 
Toliara 206 557 48.40% 146 456 34.32% 
National 2 276 471 51.15% 1 557 205 35.67% 
 
Source: Ministry of the Interior, Madagascar (December 22, 2002) as reported by the daily L'Express de 
Madagascar (December 23, 2002). 
 
 
What greater violation of the spirit of democratic outcome could there be than if the 
undisputable choice of the people doesn’t win the election because of institutional constraints 
engineered by his (incumbent) opponent?   
 There is little doubt that the social movement devolved into violence and, ultimately, 
thuggery.  Yet, before doing so it pushed the recalcitrant system forward.  Moreover, if 
Ravalomanana had tried to quell the masses and accept defeat it appears unlikely that the 
population would have accepted Ratsiraka’s victory.  Instead of a well-organized movement 
with a clear intent for a particular outcome, Madagascar’s masses, so embittered by an 
electoral process that resulted in the return to power of an autocrat for a third decade, may 
well have opted to destroy the system.  At minimum, Ratsiraka would not only have had to 
rule without a mandate; he would have had to rule without citizen respect for the process or 
the institutions of governance.   
 The institutional flaws highlighted by the electoral process appear to have made it 
abundantly clear that Madagascar would have been unable to move beyond an entrenched 
hybridity to the realization of popular voice.  The social movement may have also proven a 
not so subtle harbinger for greater social awareness to come.  If so, it may well have been 
the first step towards mending the gap between Madagascar’s liberal democratic populace 
and its minimally democratic government. 
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Change in leader, yes, but is Ravalomanana any different? 
 
While the social movement may well have brought about more robust political participation 
and swept out the neopatrimonial regime of Didier Ratsiraka, what is new is not always better.   
Marc Ravalomanana appears a man of the people but he is a political neophyte.  Worse, his 
background is as a businessman known for running a ship while alone at the helm.  Evidence 
that caution is necessary with Madagascar’s new leadership can be found in the creation of 
his new party, Tiako i Madagasikara (TIM). 
 On August 3, 2002 the TIM announced its independence from Marc Ravalomanana 
and its intent to run TIM party candidates in the elections for the December 2002 national 
assembly.  The independence of the party, however, appears as of yet to be a mirage.  First 
to note, it is Marc Ravalomanana who created TIM, not the other way around.  To date, it is 
only as strong as he allows it to be. Second, TIM bares an uncomfortable proximity to 
Ravalomanana’s Tiko. 
 Ravalomanana has also displayed his pleasure for putting his close associates in 
office. Ravalomanana forced out the offending governors of the social movement period.  He 
wasted no time removing those 30 senators appointed by Ratsiraka and replacing them with 
his own.  While this did not give him a majority in the senate, he was then able to get Guy 
Rajemison Rakotomaharo elected President of the Senate.  Rakotomaharo was a long time 
advisor to Ravalomanana when the latter was the CEO of Tiko, and he even occasionally took 
over in Ravalomanana’s absence when the latter was mayor.   Similarly, Vice Prime Minister 
Narisoa Rajaonarivony was formerly a marketing director at Tiko and Secretary of State for 
Commerce, Eric Beantanana, worked for Tiko and then Ravalomanana’s Mayoral campaign.  
The president of the new TIM, Raharinaivo Andrianantoandro, was a municipal counselor to 
Marc Ravalomanana as mayor of Antananarivo, and a Tiko official before that.  Heriniaina 
Razafimahefa, Secretary-General of TIM, was Director General of Tiko.  TIM B.P National 
Patrick Ramiaramanana was also once Director General of Tiko, and so it goes.  As long as 
there is such a strong confluence between the TIM party and Tiko faithful, it is hard to see 
how Marc Ravalomanana can forsake personal rule. 
 The results of the December 15, 2002 elections for the National Assembly were as 
predicted.  Ratsiraka’s AREMA party won only three seats, and its partner, Leader-Fanilo, two 
seats.  TIM, on the other hand, won 103 of the 150 seats in the National Assembly.  The 
closely aligned Firaisankinam-Pirenena (National Union) won 22 seats, and the other 30 
seats went to small parties and independents. This victory came with a high 67.9 percent 
voter turnout rate.  The African Union had, somewhat dubiously, asked Madagascar to use 
the legislative election as a presidential mandate.  It appears Ravalomanana got his mandate.   
 Just as everyone in Madagascar knows that the fortunes of AREMA rose and fell with 
Ratsiraka, so everyone today knows that TIM has risen with Ravalomanana.  It is yet to be 
seen if Ravalomanana has the gumption, strength, and selflessness to ultimately shirk the 
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pattern of the personalized party and work to institutionalize a viable and lasting party 
system.  
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Despite the changes of 2002 – the near war, the shift in power, the imminent review of the 
constitution, the likely change of legislative control, the revisiting of judicial authority in 
process – Madagascar’s attempt at political institutionalization, and thus party formation, is 
not radical.  It is incremental.  At no point was there an attempt to fundamentally change the 
nature of the system or to uproot the ancien regime in its entirety deus ex machina.5 If the 
new regime is embedded in the ancien regime then it is characterized by princely rule.  It will 
take a man of courage to break with this long history and turn power over to the institutions 
in which they belong. 
 While there is reason to be cautious about whether Madagascar’s new president will 
prove more Havelian than Machiavellian in character, there is also reason to rejoice over 
Madagascar’s new opportunity.  Only six months before the presidential elections it appeared 
as if Ratsiraka would return to office virtually without contest.  Without Marc Ravalomanana 
the electorate would have continued to feel disenfranchised and the abstentionist trend would 
not have relented.  Further, empowered by a new mandate Ratsiraka would have continued to 
(legally) dismantle popular access to the political sphere.  Madagascar would have continued 
its backslide towards autocracy. 
 Had Ravalomanana won without dispute in the first round the likely result would have 
been a short honeymoon.  By January he would have been feeling the pressure to perform. – 
the pressure to bring about the sorts of changes in political and economic life the populace 
has been clamoring for.  The social movement, however, crowned him the populist he 
yearned to be.  With each passing day come new fears that Ratsiraka’s mercenaries will land 
on Malagasy shores (Liberation, July 12, 2003), and that Ratsiraka’s associates still in the 
country would try to undermine the new leadership.  Ravalomanana turns not to his victory at 
the ballot box, but his victory in the streets to win the support of the populace as a man of 
action – to demonstrate his legitimacy.  He gained the cooperation of African partners to 
stem the possibility of a coup attempt and he launched a campaign, perhaps even a witch-
hunt, to route out the last roots of Ratisiraka’s neopatriomonial network.  Following the 
legislative elections of December 2002 it is clear that Ravalomanana won the support 
necessary to embark on his ambitious plan for national reform.  Electoral reform is imminent, 
a new constitutional convention is in the works, and a flow of international capital unlike 
                                                          
5  Bratton, Michael and Nicolas Van de Walle (1994) discuss the challenges to even willing leaders to overcome the 
vestiges of neopatrimonial rule. 
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anything seen in decades appears ready to help him with institution-building, social recovery, 
and economic reform.   
 While Madagascar’s democracy is still nascent, fragile, feeble, and vulnerable to 
elites, there is finally something new.  There is new leadership.  There is a new national plan.  
When electoral participation in Madagascar was trumped by participation through social 
action the will of the people was able to overcome ossification of not-so-democratic 
“democratic” institutions and to give renewed hope to a citizenry that had all but given up. 
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Zusammenfassung 
 
Am 16. Dezember 2001 erhielt Marc Ravalomanana im ersten Wahlgang der Prä si-
dentschaftswahlen in Madagaskar die Mehrheit vor dem amtierenden Prä sidenten Didier 
Ratsiraka. Die Stimmauszä hlung fü hrte zu einer Wahlkrise. Das Innenministerium behauptete, 
Ravalomanana habe 46% der Stimmen erhalten, wohingegen eine unabhä ngige Kommission 
Ravalomanana 50,5% der Stimmen und somit den Sieg im ersten Wahlgang zuerkannte. 
Hunderttausende Madagassen gingen zur Unterstü tzung Ravalomananas auf die Straß e, was 
zu einem gewaltsamen, fü nf Monate anhaltenden Aufruhr fü hrte. Diese Studie stellt die Frage: 
Darf ein Herausforderer zu nicht verfassungsmä ß igen Maß nahmen greifen, wenn er sich in 
hohem Maß e einem betrü gerischen Wahlablauf und einem Mangel an verfassungsmä ß igen 
Mö glichkeiten zur Korrektur des Ergebnisses gegenü ber sieht? Wo Demokratisierung sich 
ganz auf formale Prozesse konzentriert und dabei andere liberale demokratische Maß nahmen 
ausschließ t, muss dieser Prozess letztendlich zu einem unanfechtbaren Ergebnis kommen – 
andernfalls gerä t der Demokratisierungsprozess in Gefahr. 
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Ré sumé  
 
Le 16 dé cembre 2001, Marc Ravalomanana remporta au premier tour l’é lection pré sidentielle 
à  Madagascar, devanç ant le pré sident sortant Didier Ratsiraka. Le dé compte des voix entraî na 
une crise é lectorale, le Ministre de l’Inté rieur affirmant que Ravalomanana avait obtenu 46 % 
des suffrages, alors qu’une commission indé pendante lui reconnaissait 50,5 % des suffrages 
et donc la victoire au premier tour. Des centaines de milliers de Malgaches sortirent dans les 
rues pour manifester leur soutien à  Ravalomanana, ce qui aboutit à  un climat de violence 
durant cinq mois. Cette é tude pose la question suivante : un candidat a-t-il le droit de recourir 
à  des moyens hors de la Constitution lorsqu’il est confronté  à  une fraude é lectorale massive et 
à  un manque de possibilité s constitutionnelles pour corriger le ré sultat proclamé  ? Là  où  la 
dé mocratisation se concentre sur des processus formels, tout en excluant d’autres mesures 
dé mocratiques plus libé rales, ce processus doit absolument aboutir à  un ré sultat 
incontestable, ou alors la dé mocratisation est en danger. 
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